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STATE OF NEW.YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#lA-10/23/81 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF NASSAU (DEPARTMENT OF DRUG BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
AND ALCOHOL ADDICTION), : 
Respondent, : 
Case No. U-4328 
-and- : 
NASSAU COUNTY CHAPTER OF THE CIVIL : 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party.• 
EDWARD G. McCABE, ESQ. (JACK 
OLCHIN, ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Respondent 
RICHARD M. GABA, ESQ. (BARRY J. 
PEEK, ESQ., of Counsel), for 
Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the County of 
Nassau on behalf of its Department of Drug and Alcohol Addiction, 
respondent herein, to a hearing officer's decision determining 
that it violated its duty to negotiate in good faith with the 
Nassau County Chapter of the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., the charging party. 
For six years Nassau County's Department of Drug and :V 
Alcohol Addiction (Department) rented space in a privately owned 
building. The lease provided for twenty reserved on-premises 
parking spaces which were allotted to employees of the Department 
on the basis of job responsibility and seniority. Subsequent to 
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the execution of the lease, the lessor made additional free park-
ing available to employees of the Department at a nearby garage 
which it owned. 
This situation came to an end on October 1, 1979, when the 
Department moved its offices to other privately owned premises. 
The new lease provided for twenty-two on-premises parking spaces 
which were allotted as before. Neither respondent nor the hew leasor 
made arrangements for free:, parking'by those employees of the De-
partment to whom on-premises parking spaces -were not made available. 
The charging party complained to the respondent that the 
loss of free parking constituted a unilateral change in .their 
terms and conditions of employment and it demanded that respon-
dent negotiate as to the loss of the free parking. Respondent 
answered that it would not do so because, in its opinion, parking 
facilities for unit employees on privately-owned premises is not 
a term and condition of employment.-
Although these events took place during the term of a col-
lective bargaining agreement between respondent and charging 
party, the record does not show that the agreement dealt with 
the subject of free parking for Department employees or that 
the matter had been considered during negotiations. Accord-
ingly, the applicable rule is as stated in New Paltz CSD, 11 
PERB 113057, at p. 3088: 
Notwithstanding the existence of an agreement, 
there is a duty to negotiate over mandatory 
subjects of negotiations not covered by the 
agreement unless there is an explicit waiver. 
i 
i 
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Charging party then filed the charge herein in which it com- | 
plained that respondent violated §209-a.l(d) both by refusing' to j 
negotiate a mandatory subject of negotiation and by taking uni-
lateral action with respect to that subject. The hearing officer 
determined that free parking is a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
In doing, so, he cited the decision of this Board in State of New j 
York, 6 PERB 13005 (1973), ~in which we held that ""the availability I 
of free parking is a term and condition of employment . . .". 
Finding that respondent refused to negotiate the subject, he deter-
mined that it violated Section 209-a.1(d) of the Taylor Law. j 
The hearing officer dismissed the specification of the 
charge alleging a unilateral change by respondent. He found that 
it was not respondent that made the change in the Department's 
employees' free parking privileges. It had not arranged for free j 
parking for most of these employees in the Department before it j 
s j 
moved its office and •:v did'.•"'" riot ' :'• arrange for free parking for j. 
them after the move. As the hearing officer said, the free park-
i 
ing enjoyed by the Department's employees was not an emolument of j. 
their employment, but a privilege arising outside the employment j 
relationship. | 
Respondent takes exception to so much of the hearing offi-
cer's decision as holds that it refused to negotiate a mandatory j 
subject of negotiation. It would distinguish 'State' of New York 
' 
on the ground that the State had initiated a charge for parking 
5 
in a lot that was owned or leased by it, while the instant case § 
\ 
i 
E 
! 
i 
i 
i 
{ i SJJ\J 
I 
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involves a parking fee charged by parking lots over which respon-
dent has no control.' The distinction proposed by respondent is 
not a persuasive one. The availability of free parking while at 
work is a mandatory subject of negotiation because it is an eco-
nomic benefit to the employees similar to the use of an employer's 
2 / 
vehicle for commuting to and from work—' and the furnishing by an 
3/ employer of working tools.— 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the hearing of-
ficer, and 
WE ORDER the County of Nassau to negotiate the demand of 
the Nassau County Chapter of the Civil Service Em-
ployees Association, Inc., that free parking be made 
available to employees of the Department of Drug and 
Alcohol Addiction. 
Dated, New York, New York 
October 23, 1981 
farold R, Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Rsfridles, Memb 
2/ 
3/ 
See O y s t e r Bay, 14 PERB 1(3002 (1981), 
See N a s s a u C h a p t e r C'SEA v . ' HeTsby, 54 AD2d 725 (Second Dep t . , 
1 9 7 6 ) . 
i h s j 'i 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
, , #lB-10/23/81 
In the Matter of 
BEACON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, ; 
Respondent, 
; BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
-and- j 
BEACON TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, : 
,:# ; CASE NO. U-5025 
Charging Party. \ 
THOMAS P. HALLEY, ESQ., for 
Respondent 
ARTHUR L. LAVALETTE, JR., for 
Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Beacon City 
School District (District) to a decision of a hearing officer 
that it violated its duty to negotiate in good faith with the 
Beacon Teachers Association (Association). The violation consisted 
of requiring physical education teachers who were hired after 
September 1, 1980, to accept the responsibility for two coaching 
assignments. The physical education teachers are in the negotia-
ting unit represented by the Association. 
Through the 1979-80 school year, the District satisfied its 
coaching needs by appointing volunteers, who were paid pursuant 
to a negotiated schedule. The coaching duties were performed 
after regular school hours. Finding it difficult to get a 
sufficient number of volunteers, the District unilaterally adopted 
a new policy and procedures on July 28, 1980, which requires 
physical education teachers who would be hired after September 1, 
1980, to accept two coaching assignments in the event that quali-
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1/ 
fied volunteers are not forthcoming. As before, the coaching 
duties would be performed after regular school hours and the 
coaches would be compensated at the negotiated rate. The Associa-
tion protested the District's unilateral action and, when the 
District refused to rescind it, the Association filed the charge 
herein. 
The hearing officer concluded that the imposition of 
coaching assignments upon the physical education teachers was a 
mandatory subject of negotiation and that the District's unilateral 
action had, therefore, constituted a violation of §209-a.l(d) of 
the Taylor Law. To remedy its violation, the hearing officer 
directed the District to rescind the procedure adopted in July 
1980, to compensate coaches who did not volunteer for work at an 
hourly rate to be calculated on the basis of their annual salary 
and to negotiate in good faith with the Association. In its 
1/ In pertinent part, the rules adopted on July 28, 1980 provide: 
"Effective September 1, 1980, all persons receiving 
probationary appointments to Physical Education 
teaching positions in the Beacon School District 
shall be...required to sign a 'Condition of Employ-
ment Statement' which will require the appointee to 
coach a maximum of two sports during the school year 
under the following circumstances: 
'If after postings, media advertisements and 
other reasonable efforts fail to obtain adequate 
numbers of qualified applicants to properly fill 
all coaching openings, physical education teachers 
subject to this Policy will be required to serve 
in coaching capacities for which, in the judge-
ment of the Director of Athletics, feels they are 
qualified.' (sic) 
....In the event that the number of qualified candidates 
exceeds the position(s) available, a physical education 
teacher may be temporarily excused from coaching at the 
discretion of the Director of Athletics." 
Board - U-5025 -3 
exceptions, the District argues that the requirement that newly 
hired teachers accept coaching assignments was merely a qualifica-
tions for their employment and, therefore, not a mandatory subject 
of negotiation. It also argues that the hearing officer erred in 
awarding the coaches anything more than the negotiated rate of 
pay- •' : 
We affirm the decision of the hearing officer. The assign-
ment of coaching responsibilities after the regular school day 
involves the hours of work of unit employees and is a mandatory 
subject of negotiation. CSL §201.4. The District is, therefore, 
prohibited from acting unilaterally regarding this matter, but 
must negotiate it with the Association, the representative of the 
physical education teachers. CSL §204.2. It is not excused from 
such negotiations by reason of the "condition of Employment 
Statements" executed by individual physical education teachers 
on the occasion of their being, hired. As the hearing officer 
noted, an obligation to accept coaching responsibilities is not 
in the nature of a qualification for employment because it is not 
2/ 
related to the employee's ability to perform his job,— It is a 
term and condition of their continuing employment and not 
-
7See Nassau Chapter CSEA v. Helsby, 54 AD2d 725 (2dDept., 1976), 
9 PERB 1(7022, in which the Appellate Division determined that 
a requirement unilaterally imposed by the employer that newly 
hired auto mechanics must furnish their own hand tools was not a 
qualification for employment. 
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merely a condition for becoming an employee. The distinction between the two 
was well noted by the hearing officer, who said: 
T
'An individual's agreement that he will work hours in excess 
of those otherwise prevailing for as long as he holds a posi-
tion under threat of termination for non-compliance is no more 
performance-related than a requirement that he work for a pre-
determined wage for as long as he stays on the job." 
Thus we find that the District committed an improper practice by giving physi-
cal education teachers coaching assignments pursuant to its policy of July-28, 
1980. 
We affirm the hearing officer's determination that the District should 
compensate each coach who did not volunteer on the basis of an hourly rate com-
puted from his annual salary and applied to the hours spent coaching. As noted 
by the hearing officer, the contract rate for coaching is applicable only to 
those who volunteer for the coaching responsibilities. Work performed because 
of an improper compulsory assignment should not be compensated at less than 
the employee's regular rate. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE DETERMINE that the District violated §209-a.l(d) of 
the Taylor Law, and 
WE ORDER IT: 
1. Immediately to rescind and cease enforcement of the 
athletic coaching policy and 
3/ The distinction between a condition for being offered employment and a con-
dition of employment has been made by Michigan ' (Detroit Police Officers 
Association v. Detroit, 291 Mich. 44, 85 LRRM 2535 [Mich. Sup. Ct., 19/4]); 
Wisconsin (City o£ Brookfield v. WERC, 87 LRRM 2099 [Wise. Cir. Ct., 1974]) 
and Massachusetts (Boston ScEool Teachers Committee, 3 MLC 1602 [Mass. Labor 
Commission, 1977]). The courts or agencies ot the three states have held 
that, while a public employer is free to require residency within the com-
munity as a condition for being employed by it, it must negotiate the subiect 
of a continuing residency requirement for the employees after they are hired. 
The same distinction is not applicable in New York State only because Public 
Officers Law, §30, specifically makes a residency requirement continually 
applicable to employees to whom it was applicable when they were hired. 
Salamanca, 12 PERB 13079 (1979). I 
! 
r y^i'% of: \ 
1 
I 
i 
i f 
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regulations issued pursuant thereto in 
July 1980; 
2. Immediately to rescind and cease enforce-
ment of any agreements made by individuals 
pursuant to either the policy or regula-
tions above; 
3. To pay to any employees assigned coaching 
duties pursuant to the policy or 
regulations above a sum to equal the total 
wages due at the hourly rate of the appli-
cable annual salary for the hours worked 
in the performance of the assigned duties, 
less moneys received therefor, with 
interest ori this sum at the rate of three 
percent per annum calculated from the date 
of each employee's first performance of 
the assigned duties; 
4. To negotiate in good faith with the BTA 
the salaries, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment of employees 
represented by the BTA; 
Board - U-5025 -6 
5. To post a signed notice in the form 
attached at all locations in the District 
ordinarily used to post notices of 
information to unit employees. 
DATED: October 23, 1981 
New York, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
/Cy<g£Sa 
David C. Randies, Member 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLOYE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify our employees that the Beacon City School District will: 
1) Immediately rescind and cease enforcement of the athletic 
coaching policy and regulations issued pursuant thereto in 
July 1980; 
2) Immediately rescind and cease enforcement of any agreements 
made by individuals pursuant to either the policy or regula-
tions above; 
3) Pay to any employees assigned coaching duties pursuant to the 
policy or regulations above a sum to equal the total wages due 
at the hourly rate of the applicable annual salary for the hours 
worked in the performance of the assigned duties, less moneys 
received therefor, with interest on this sum at the rate of 
three per cent, per annum calculated from the date of each em-
ployee's first performance of the assigned duties; 
4) Negotiate in good faith with the Beacon Teachers Association 
(BTA) salaries, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment of employees represented by the BTA. 
BEACON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Employer 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered 
defaced, or covered by any other material. P ^ ~ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matt 
VILLAGE OF 
-and-
er of 
FAIRPORT, 
Charging Pai 
FAIRPORT POLICE BILLY CLUB, 
Respondent. 
"ty, : 
#10-10/23/81 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Case No. U-5508 
HARRIS, BEACH, WILCOX, RUBIN AND 
LEVEY, ESQS, (PETER J, SPINELLI, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging 
Party 
GARY VAN SON, ESQ.',' for Respondent 
The Fairport Police Billy Club (Club) represents a unit of 
patrolmen and sergeants in the Police Department of the Village o 
Fairport (Village). They were in negotiations for a collective 
bargaining agreement to succeed one that expired on May 3, 1981, 
when, on June 6, 1981, the Club petitioned for interest arbitra-
tion, pursuant to §209.4 of the Taylor Law. Among the negotia- I 
tion demands specified in the petition was one for a 20-year, 
half-pay retirement benefit. The Village then filed the charge 
herein in which it alleges that the Club violated its duty to 
negotiate in good faith by seeking the retirement benefit in 
interest arbitration. 
The Village does not argue that the retirement demand is a 
non-mandatory subject of negotiation.!/ The Village contends 
—' On the contrary, it concedes that the retirement benefit 
sought is one that is made available by Section 384-d 
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that it was improper for the Club to seek it in interest arbitra-
tion because the scope of arbitration is narrower than the scope 
of mandatory negotiations. The basis for this contention is that 
under New York State Constitution, Art. 5, §7, a grant to em-
ployees of retirement benefits is irrevocable, while §209.4(c)(vi) 
of the Taylor Law provides that the determination of a public 
arbitration panel shall not bind the parties for a period in ex-
cess of two years. The Village argues that an arbitration panel's 
determination "-would bind the parties for more than two years and 
would, therefore, be beyond its authority under the Taylor Law. 
The Village acknowledges that this Board has rejected the 
identical, argument in Town 'of Haver straw, 12 PERB 1f3085 (1979) and 
2/ it is asking us to overrule the prior decision,--- Along with the 
Club, it requests that we expedite resolution of the dispute pur-
suant to §204.4 of our Rules by dispensing, with the intermediate 
decision of the hearing officer. Inasmuch as it is beyond the 
authority of :a .hearing officer to overrule a decision of this 
Board, we grant the joint request of the parties and apply the 
expedited procedure of Rule 204.4. 
Having considered the briefs of the parties, we find no legal 
arguments that persuade us to do other than'to reaffirm the legal 
-i / (continued) 
— of the Retirement and Social Security Law. According to 
Chapter 25 of the Laws of 1975, as last amended by Chapter 
381 of the Laws of 1981, such a demand is a mandatory sub-
ject of negotiation. 
2/ 
— Our decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Haverstraw 
v. Newman, 13 PERB 117008 (Rockland Co., 1980) and an appeal 
to the Appellate Division, Second Department, is pending. 
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3/ principles stated in Haverstraw— including the proposition of 
law that the scope of interest arbitration is coextensive with 
4/ the scope of negotiations.— 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it 
hereby is, DISMISSED. 
DATED: October 22, 1981 
New- York, New.. York- . .  . ._ 
l a r o l d R. Newman, Chairman 
-g^S^ /Cd AoC<J^L 
I d a Klaus ,' Member 
%M, 
David ,C. Rand ies , 'Memb 
3/ 
— I n that decision, we stated: 
"The purpose of the two-year limitation, as we understand it, 
was to permit the relationship of the parties to a deadlock 
in negotiations to survive the absence of an agreement during 
the deadlock period while preserving their duty to negotiate 
their own terms and conditions of employment thereafter. 
There is no indication that the Legislature intended the two-
year limitation to restrict the arbitration of retirement 
benefits....Had the Legislature wished to do so, it could 
have enacted a law creatine; a narrower scope of''arbitration 
.thantth^ i?scapevof'-"'nBgo-txati^  
Irrevocable nature of such benefits. 
-/±n City of Albany, 7 PERB 113078 (1974), this Board resolved a 
related question. In a case involving, inter alia, a demand for 
improved retirement benefits, we held that the scope of negoti-
ation of police and firefighter disputes was not narrowed as a 
consequence of the availability of interest arbitration to 
resolve deadlocks. The courts confirmed this decision. City of 
Albany v. Helsby, 48 AD2d 998 (3rd Dept., 1975), 8 PERB 117012, 
affirmed 38 NY2d 778 (1975), 9 PERB 1f7005. 
^/-f /?i 
{ - ' - •• •* *.w 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PENFIELD CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Upon the Application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential 
#lD-10/23/81 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. E-0730 
HARRIS, BEACH, WILCOX, RUBIN.-. &_ 
LEVEY,, ESOS.(MARY J. HARRINGTON, 
of Counsel), for Applicant. 
SALOME P. KAMAKER for PENFIELD 
ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATIONAL SECRE-
TARIES , Intervener. 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Penfield 
Central School District (District) to a Decision of the Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) deny-
ing in part the District's application for the designation of 
Diane Fishel (Fishel), the District's Assistant to the Business 
Manager, and Dorothy Dubois (Dubois), the District's Treasurer, as 
y 
confidential employees. 
The'exceptions of the District, in summary, claim that the 
determination of the Director with respect to Fishel and Dubois 
does not comport with the facts or the law. Considerable effort 
is expended by the District seeking to demonstrate that the data 
available to Fishel and Dubois is exempt from the provisions of 
the Freedom of Information Law, therefore rendering the data con-
fidential and consequently warranting the designation of the per-
sonnel working with such data as confidential. 
1/ The District applied for the designation of eleven clerical 
—
 employees as confidential pursuant to Civil Service Law 
§201.7(a). The Director granted the application with respect 
to seven employees. The exceptions of the District relate 
to two of the four employees for whom the Director denxed the 
application. 
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I 
I 
| 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the factual findings of | 
the Director and his ultimate conclusions that Fishel and Dubois j 
are not "confidential" employees within the intendiment of Civil \ 
Service Law (CSL) §201.7(a). .'. ] 
- - ' - ' • • - • •" " " "'"" " " " ' " " " " f 
I 
Under the facts of this record it is immaterial to our deter-
mination whether the data available to Fishel and Dubois qualifies 
for exemption under the Freedom of Information Law. The testimony! 
of the Business Manager establishes that while he inquires of I 
Fishel and Dubois as to revenues, unencumbered balances, and expen -j 
ditures, he reserves to himself the making of such analysis as 
will permit projections concerning the availability of funds for 
negotiation purposes. Both Fishel and Dubois denied having been 
told that the data they retrieved was to be used in negotiations 
or having been involved in the development or formulation of nego- j 
! 
tiation policy, or proposals. Being in a position to speculate as j 
I 
to the conclusions that might be drawn from the financial data they I 
abstract from the records for the Business Manager does not con-
stitute the performance of confidential functions which warrants' I 
.2/ 
their designation as "confidential" employees under CSL § 201.7(a;—J 
2/ In Binghamton, 12 PERB 13099 (1979), we noted that CSL §201.7(a) 
prescribes that a managerial employee is one who may be reason-
ably required to perform managerial functions, while a confiden-
tial employee is one who actually performs confidential 
functions. 
Board - E-0730 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the Decision of the1 Director in 
this matter be, and it hereby is, affirmed. 
DATED: New York, New York 
October 23, 1981 
~^fcZ+C-*£'^#£~v-**''i-y~. 
H a r o l d R. Newman, Chairman 
abU* A3& 4U<s4~~~~ 
I d a K l a u s , Member 
^ ft/i 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ENLARGED CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF 
SARATOGA SPRINGS, ' 
Employer, 
-and-
SARATOGA TRANSPORTATION EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
SARATOGA SPRINGS SCHOOL DISTRICT TRANSPORTATION 
EMPLOYEES UNIT OF THE SARATOGA COUNTY 
EDUCATIONAL CHAPTER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 8456-1, 
Intervenor. 
#lE-10/23/83 
BOARD DECISION 
AND 
ORDER 
CASE NO. C-2138. 
THEODORE GREY, ESQ., for Employer 
GARY C. JOHNSON, ESO. (DORSEY, LeCAIN & 
MORRIS, ESQS., of Counsel by JOHN 0. LeCAIN, 
ESQ.), for Petitioner 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH, ESQS. (RICHARD L. 
BURSTEIN, ESQ., of Counsel), for Intervenor 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Saratoga Springs j 
School District Transportation Employees Unit of the Saratoga j 
County Educational Chapter of the Civil Service Employees j 
I 
Association, Inc., Local 8456-1 (CSEA) to a decision of the | 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation [ 
(Director). The Director determined that the Saratoga Transporta- j 
tion Employees Association (STEA), the petitioner herein, is..an | 
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employee organization, and that it may participate in an election 
in a stipulated unit of bus drivers and mechanics employed by the 
Enlarged City School District of the City of Saratoga Springs 
(District). 
Until July 1977, the District employed bus drivers and 
mechanics, who were part of ah overall non-instructional 
negotiating unit represented by CSEA. At that time, over CSEA's 
objections, the District entered into a contract with the Upstate 
Transport Consortium, Inc. (UTC), a private business, pursuant to 
which UTC would provide transportation services to the District. 
UTC then hired most, if not all, of the drivers and mechanics 
who worked for the District. 
CSEA filed an improper practice charge protesting that the 
District violated its duty to negotiate in good faith by entering 
into the contract with UTC, We found merit in the charge and 
ordered the District to offer reinstatement to its former drivers 
and mechanics. Saratoga Springs School District, 11 PERB 113037 
(1978). The District appealed the decision and it was confirmed 
by the Appelate Division of the Supreme Court. Saratoga Springs 
City: School, District: v.. PERB,/-68,AD2d- 202 (3d Dept., 1979) 12 PERB 1(7008. 
The course of litigation ended in July 1979 when the Court of 
Appeals denied the District's motion for leave to appeal and 
the District rehired its former employees. Saratoga Springs City 
School District v. PERB, 47 NY2d 711, 12 PERB 117012 (1979). 
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CSEA represented the drivers and mechanics during the two 
years they worked for UTC and it continued to do so when they 
were rehired by the District. However, unlike the situation 
during their previous District employment, the drivers and mechan-
ics are now represented in a separate negotiating unit. 
During the two years they worked for UTC, the drivers and 
mechanics received benefits in the areas of health and disability 
insurance, leaves of absence, retirement and job security that 
were greater than those they had received when employed by the 
District. When the District resumed operation of its transporta-
tion services and rehired them, the drivers and mechanics lost 
the improved benefits that UTC had provided. They therefore pre-
ferred to work for UTC. When negotiations commenced in May 1980, 
pursuant to a wage reopener, they urged CSEA to include the 
subject of subcontracting in the negotiations. CSEA refused and, 
on September 22, 1980, the drivers and mechanics met and voted 
overwhelmingly to form their own organization if CSEA would not 
support their position on subcontracting. They met again on 
September 29, at which time they further discussed their dissatis-
factions with CSEA, some, of which were unrelated to subcontracting 
and they adopted a resolution to seek its decertification unless 
it would support their position on subcontracting. In prepara-
tion for a meeting on October 27, the leadership group drew up a 
proposed constitution for a new organization. 
The complaints of the drivers and mechanics about. CSEA at . 
the October 27 meeting;, no longer focused upon the subcontracting 
issue. Instead, the discussion dealt with a general dissatis-
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faction with CSEA and the unit employees' preference for an 
independent organization to represent them. Changes in the draft 
constitution were discussed and, as changed, it was adopted in 
principle. The organization was given a name, an interim presi-
dent was elected, and the decision was made to seek certification 
for the new organization. The petition herein was filed two 
weeks later. Thereafter, the'proposed'constitution was prepared 
and submitted to: ;the membership who. ratified it on January .9, •... 
1.981. Permanent officers were- then elected,. . : , , 
The District raised no question regarding the petition. CSEA 
intervened and asserted that STEA was not an employee organization 
1 / 
within the meaning of the Taylor Law at the time it filed the 
petition. The Director determined that STEA was an employee 
organization and he ordered that there be an election in the unit 
of drivers and mechanics in which the choices to be offered to 
the employees would include STEA. 
The matter now comes to us on the exceptions of CSEA in 
support of which it argues that the Director erred in his findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. 
The Director determined that the drivers' and mechanics' 
adoption of a name for STEA, their election of an interim presi-
dent and their discussion of a constitution were sufficient 
1/ As relevant to the issue before us, §201.5 of the Taylor Law 
defines an employee organization as "an organization of any 
kind having as its primary purpose the improvement of terms 
and conditions of employment of public employees...." 
H-f M p 
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indicia of the existence of STEA as an employee organization on 
October 27, 1980. He further determined that STEA was an 
employee organization within the meaning of the Taylor Law in that 
it seeks to represent drivers and mechanics who are currently 
public employees and to improve their terms and conditions of 
employment through negotiations under the Taylor Law, 
We affirm the Director's findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that a secret ballot election be 
held among employees in .the following unit, 
stipulated by the parties, who are employed 
on the payroll date immediately preceding 
this decision: 
Included: Transportation Personnel 
Excluded: Transportation Supervisor, 
Dispatcher, Chief Executive 
Officer, Central Office 
managerial and confidential 
employees, employees in other 
bargaining units and employees 
2/ See State of New York, 10 PERB 1(3092 : (1977), in which we 
found the Public Employee Federation to be an employee organi-
zation at a time when it had fewer characteristics of an 
existing employee organization than STEA had when it filed 
the petition herein. 
im 
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who do not have a permanently 
assigned run and/or work less 
than (4) hours per day. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the employer shall submit to the 
Director and the two employee organizations, 
within ten days from the date of receipt 
of this decision, an alphabetized list of 
all employees within the stipulated unit 
who were employed on the payroll date 
immediately preceding the date of this 
decision. 
DATED: New York, New York 
October 23, 1981 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of : #1F-10/23/81 
CITY OF YONKERS PARKING AUTHORITY UNIT of 
the CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, BOARD DECISION 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO " ^^SinSSfilC 
upon the Charge of Violation of Section CASE NO. D-0223 
210.1 of the Civil Service Law. "''"" : 
On July 7, 1981, the Chief Legal Officer of the City of j 
! 
Yonkers Parking Authority (the Authority) filed a charge alleging! 
that the City of Yonkers Parking Authority Unit of the Civil j 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) had violated Civil Service Law (CSL) §210.1 in that it 
caused, instigated, encouraged, condoned and engaged in a one- | 
day strike against the Authority on July 1, 1981. 
The charge further alleged that all save two-members of CSEAj 
narticipated in the strike. ( 
I 
The CSEA filed an answer but thereafter agreed to withdraw 1 
it, thus admitting the factual allegations of the charge, upon | 
the understanding that the charging party would recommend, and j 
this Board would accept, a penalty of loss of CSEA's right to 
have dues and agency shop fees deducted for a period of three (3) 
months. The charging-party has so recommended. \ 
On the basis of the unanswered charge, we find that CSEA i 
violated CSL §210.1 in that it engaged in a strike as charged, I 
i 
and we determine that the recommended penalty is a reasonable one? 
.1 
e 
and will effectuate the policies of the Act. j 
) 
I 
I 
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WE ORDER that the dues and agency shop fees, if any, deduction 
rights of the City of Yonkers Parking Authority Unit of the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
be suspended, commencing on the first practicable date, and con-
tinuing for a period of three months. Thereafter, no dues or 
agency shop fees shall be deducted on its behalf by the City of 
Yonkers Parking Authority until the City of Yonkers Parking 
Authority Unit of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO affirms that it no longer asserts the 
right to strike against any government as required by the 
provisions of CSL §210.3(g). 
DATED: .New York,: New. York 
October 22, 1981 
G^tr+u^L^ 
H a r o l d R. Newman, Chairman 
•JJU--/C& *zu+<— 
Ida Klaus 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MANHASSET UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
MANHASSET EDUCATION SUPPORT PERSONNEL 
ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner. 
#lG-10/23/81 
BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER 
CASE NO, C—22-4-6 
On April 27, 1981, the Manhasset Education Support Personnel 
Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (petitioner) filed, in accordance 
with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations 
Board, a timely petition for certification as the exclusive 
negotiating representative of certain employees employed by the 
Manhasset Union Free School District (employer). —• 
Thereafter, the parties agreed to a negotiating unit as 
follows: 
Included: All regular full-time'and regular 
part-time employees employed in the following 
titles: audio-visual technicians, cleaners, 
custodians, groundskeepers, federal/state 
funded program assistants, community aide 
(guidance), secretarial employees. 
Excluded: head custodian, assistant head 
custodian, secretary to the district clerk, 
head bookkeeper, motor repair supervisor, 
supervisor of buildings and grounds, bus 
dispatcher, community aide (Pound Hill Adult 
Learning Center) and all other employees. 
1/ The instant petition is one for initial representation of 
these employees. 
1 
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Pursuant to agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on 
September 22, 1981 at which there were 55 ballots cast in favor 
of representation by the petitioner and 55 ballots against 
2/ ' 
representation by petitioner.— Inasmuch as the results of the 
election do not indicate that the majority of eligible voters in 
the agreed upon unit who cast valid ballots desire to be repre-
sented for purposes of collective bargaining by the petitioner, 
IT IS ORDERED that the petition' should' be, and it'hereby is 
dismissed-; 
Dated: October 23, 1981 
.New, York, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
/Cx<5ftU-^>-
Ida Klaus, Member 
2/ The Rules provide for a run-off election only "when an 
election in which the ballot provides for not less than three 
choices (i.e., at least two employee organizations and 
'neither') results in no choice receiving a majority of 
the valid ballots cast." [§201.9(i) (1)]' " 
7154 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF WALDEN, 
rand-
DISTRICT 65, U.A.W., 
Employer, 
Petitioner. 
#2A-10/23/81 
Case No. C-22 83 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accordance 
with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules of 
Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating repre-', 
sentative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that 
District 65, U.A.W. 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the .employees of 
the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for 
the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: 
Excluded: 
PERB 58.3 
Water meter reader, water operator, sewer operator, 
mechanical equipment operator', laborers, mechanic, 
dispatchers, crossing guards, .custodian, court clerk. 
Village manager, village clerk, public works 
superintendent, police officers, clerk treasurer, 
village manager's secretary, building inspector, 
per diem dispatchers, department of public works 
summer, employees ,' per diem court clerks, and all 
other employees. ^ 
Further, IT IS ORDERED' that the above named public, employer 
shall negotiate collectively with. 
District 65, U.A.W. ' • • 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee.organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on- the 23rd day of October., 1981 
New York, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
7155 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DEER PARK PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
-and-
Employer, 
#2B- 10/23/81 
Case No. C-2 2 81 
LOCAL 144/DIVISION 100, HOTEL, HOSPITAL, 
NURSING HOME AND ALLIED HEALTH SERVICES \ 
UNION, SEIU, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE . 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the-Public Employment Relations Board in accordance 
with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules of 
Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating repre-
sentative has been, selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the- Public 
Employees'. Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 144/Division 100, Hotel 
Hospital, Nursing Home and Allied Health Services Union, SEIU, AFL-CIO 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the .employees of 
the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for 
the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of
 : 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Senior clerk and full-time and part-time 
cleric typist 
Excluded: All other employees 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 144/Division 100, Hotel, 
Hospital, Nursing Home and Allied Health Services Union, SEIU, AFL-CIO 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with.regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of,- grievances.-
Signed on- the 23rd day of October , 1981 
New York, New York 
PERB 58.3 
Ha'rold R. Newman,' Ch; 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATT S BOARD 
<: In the Matter of 
t -
I |;SACHEM CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
ji Employer, 
i;. 
Ji -and-
l< 
i:LOCAL 144, DIVISION 100, SERVICE 
I'EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, 
\ AFL-CIO, 
i' P e t i t i o n e r . 
#20-10/23/81 
Case No. C-2214 
j CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE . j 
j] A representation proceeding having been conducted in the. i 
;| above matter.by the Public Employment Relations Board in accordance j 
}• with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules of \ 
j' Procedure of the- Board, and it appearing that a negotiating repre- | 
}{ sentative has been.selected, t 
ii . ; 
. . Pursuant to the.authority vested.in the- Board by the Public •; 
Employees' .Fair Employment Act, ' S 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that • I 
• ! Local 144, Division 100-, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO j 
K ' • ' ' . • • ' • ' | 
j has been designated and selected by a. majority of the employees of l 
{' the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the . "j 
j) parties'and described below, as their exclusive representative for ; 
•JI the purpose of collective .negotiations and the settlement of "• 
ji grievances. •• •,.• \ 
i.\ ' • . • ' • . • • •• . •• . \ 
!.! Unit: Included: Bus Monitors 
Excluded: All other employees. 
\\ Further,. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer. | 
•i\ shall negotiate .collectively with J 
;|Local 144, Division 100,• Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO; 
i • ' i 
f.; and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization \ 
[•• with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall '; 
[negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the ; 
i; determination of, and administration of, grievances. ' • 
j'Signed on the 23rd day of October , 1981 
if New York, New York 
Harol.d R. Newman, Chairman 
?ERB 58.3 r-.i-f c r ^ ' 
